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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this project is to identify the underlying interests of U.S. foreign policy 
towards the Kurds over time and how they have influenced the Kurdish position in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, it shall be investigated how these interests have possibly 
shifted over time. In order to examine and explain U.S. foreign policy interests, the 
theoretical framework is mainly based on offensive and defensive realism theories - 
following the ideas of John. J. Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. On the basis of a 
qualitative inquiry, the design of the project incorporates a historical and 
interpretative approach. The project’s findings illustrate that the U.S. foreign policy 
approach did not change over the course of history. The USA has been following 
realist thinking in order to fulfil its national interests. Nonetheless, historical events 
have triggered certain adjustments within U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the project, 
this will be illustrated when analysing U.S. foreign policy behaviour in terms of either 
offensive or defensive realism. The project will end with the group’s afterthoughts 
concerning the future position of the Kurds based on the knowledge achieved 
throughout the project. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Problem Area 
The current military support by the USA for the Kurds in the fight against the terrorist 
group IS, represents a major shift in the U.S.-Kurdish history and has strengthened 
their link. “Indeed, Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and, to a lesser extent, northern 
Syria have become a bulwark against jihadi groups such as ISIS and a bastion of 
stability in a region fracturing along sectarian lines” (Werz, Hoffmann 2014:1). The 
USA has acknowledged this development and is aware of the consequences regarding 
its foreign policy – especially, since its traditional partners in the region, such as 
Egypt, are currently experiencing an internal crisis themselves and are not able to 
secure the interests of the USA in the Middle East (cf. ibid.). However, this is not the 
case for its traditional partner Turkey, which is still considered a close ally to the 
USA. Although Turkey has not yet resolved its own Kurdish question, the settlement 
of the conflict has become more likely than ever. “The increasing diversity of Turkish 
society, intermarriage, the shift away from strict Kemalist state ideology, and the 
costs of the violent struggle mean there is new political space for a negotiated 
settlement; two-thirds of Turkish society favour the settlement […]” (ibid.:16). 
However, the rise of the IS in Syria and Iraq has an enormous impact on the 
neighbouring states and their Kurdish population, too. The armament of Kurdish 
fighters from Turkey against the IS has worsened the relationship once again (cf. 
Lawson 2014:1354pp).  
 
The U.S.-Kurdish interactions have a long history. In order to understand the current 
events, this has to be analysed carefully. “Despite Kurdish frustration with many 
aspects of the U.S. policy toward the region, Washington has not been explicitly 
positive or negative – nor even particular consistent – toward the Kurds” (Werz, 
Hoffmann 2014:36). The historical connections between the USA and the Kurds are 
multifarious and have changed often over time. Therefore, it is important to have a 
detailed look on the historical context and possible shifts in order to understand the 
contemporary change in the foreign policy of the USA and its relation with the Kurds. 
The current interactions between the USA and the Kurds could have an effect on the 
future position of the Kurds in the region, the regional power balance and the 
possibility of a sovereign Kurdistan. Therefore, we decided to analyse how the 
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interests of the USA have been affecting the position of the Kurds in the past, at the 
present and in the future, which has led us to the following problem formulation. 
 
1.2  Problem Formulation 
What underlying interests have caused the shifts that the U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Kurds has undergone over the period from the Cold War era to the present – 
especially in the light of the current events triggered by the expansion of the IS?  
 
1.3  Research Questions 
1. What is the historical background of the links between the USA and the 
Kurds? 
2. What are the interests behind the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds? 
3. How does U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds reflect an assumed 
offensive/defensive realist approach? 
4. How can these interests affect the future partnership between USA and the 
Kurds and the position of the Kurds in general? 
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2  METHODOLOGY  
In the following chapter, the methodology of the project will be outlined shortly. 
Firstly, the underlying motivation for choosing the topic will be introduced. The 
motivation is closely linked to the empirical and scholarly relevance of the project 
within the framework of Global Studies. Secondly, the chapter includes the design of 
the project in order to have a better understanding of the structure of the paper. In the 
following, the choice of methods, sources of errors, conceptual clarifications and 
possible delimitations will be presented.   
 
2.1  Motivation 
Our main motivation arose from a discussion about the possibility of Kurdistan 
becoming a sovereign state. Since we all agreed that the Kurds would most probably 
need external support in order to achieve their long-term goal, we ended up in a 
debate about the interests of powerful external actors towards the Kurds as an 
important minority group in the Middle Eastern region. The USA – as the most 
powerful state in the world – became a focal point of our discussion due to its 
historical entanglement with the Kurds and its general interest in the oil-rich region. 
Particularly, we are interested in the past and present foreign policy of the USA 
towards the Kurds and how this has affected the position of the minority group 
throughout history.  
 
Empirically, our main motivation comes from the immense relevance of the topic to 
the current international politics. The international community is highly concerned 
about the situation in the countries affected by the IS expansion. The evolving crisis 
has been shaping world politics since the outburst of the conflict. The international 
community is concerned about a possible further spread of the crisis and the 
ideologies of the IS. This could be linked to a new wave of terrorist attacks and the 
overall destabilisation of the Middle Eastern region. This will be further elaborated in 
the following chapters. In the light of Global Studies, it is, therefore, empirically 
extremely relevant to analyse the topic more in detail. We have decided to focus on 
the role of the Kurds since their position and status is of great importance in the 
current conflict. In general, the Kurdish question is and has been an often discussed 
topic in world politics. However, the answer to the Kurdish question is largely 
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dependant on the countries inhabited by the Kurds and the influence of external 
powers. Over the course of history, the USA has maintained ambivalent relations to 
the Kurdish minority and, thereby, influenced their regional position several times. 
Therefore, we chose the USA as an example in order to analyse great power politics 
and interests with regard to the role of the Kurds. 
 
This leads to the scholarly relevance of our project: With regard to the realism 
theories and great power politics, the project aims to examine offensive and defensive 
realism theories in the light of U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds. Furthermore, 
the project touches upon relevant theoretical concepts in the academic field of Global 
Studies and International Relations such as state sovereignty, great powers and the 
anarchy of the international system. Therefore, we consider the project to be a 
valuable contribution empirically as well as theoretically. 
 
2.2  Project Design 
The project is structured into seven chapters. In the first one, the problem area, 
problem formulation and the respective research questions were introduced. This 
chapter focuses on the methodology of the project. The following part offers an 
overview of the theoretical framework, on which the project is based on. We follow a 
realist approach – more specifically, offensive and defensive realism – in order to find 
theoretical explanations regarding the U.S. foreign policy behaviour towards the 
Kurds over the course of history and at the present. The fourth chapter is dedicated to 
the historical background of the relationship between the USA and the Kurdish 
minority and the respective states inhabited by them. In particular, we focus on the 
U.S. foreign policy and how it has influenced the Kurdish population in the course of 
the 20th century until the present. The following chapter combines the theoretical 
foundations with the historical events and empirical findings described in the fourth 
part. Thereby, the analysis focuses on the possible shifts in U.S. foreign policy 
towards the Kurds over the decades and the underlying motives for this development. 
The last two chapters consist of a discussion sections and a conclusion, which 
includes some afterthoughts and an outlook on the future position of the Kurds with 
regard to U.S. interests. 
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2.3  Choice of Methods 
Considering the analysis of our research question, we decided to use qualitative 
methods. In opposite to the quantitative approach, qualitative methods aim to describe 
variations and not quantify them (cf. Denzin 2007:3pp). The qualitative approach has 
been chosen mainly due to the non-statistical/numerical nature of our sources. The 
research was mainly based on data collection and literature review, covering both the 
empirical and the theoretical aspect of the project. In this regard, we considered that 
historical tracing is an important feature for the analysis in order to illustrate the 
development and shifts in the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds. The 
documentary research model and secondary analysis of qualitative data, namely 
academic papers and books on the topic, has been a valuable addition to our research 
design (cf. Seale 2011:347pp). Therefore, eventually, we decided to use a 
combination of the historical and interpretive approach in order to get a better 
understanding about the contextual framework that had implications for the past as 
well as for the present U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds. 
 
The theoretical framework is based on realism theories. Especially, the project 
focuses on the approaches of offensive and defensive realism thinking – following 
mainly the concepts of John J. Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. This will be further 
elaborated in the next chapter, which is dedicated to the theory used in this project. 
 
2.4  Sources of Error 
Documents on the U.S. foreign strategy in general are difficult to solely rely on due to 
the reason that U.S. rhetoric and practise in terms of foreign policy do not go hand in 
hand (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:23p). Furthermore, it is challenging to find primary 
sources that illustrate a foreign policy strategy towards the Kurds since they do not 
represent a sovereign state but a minority group. Therefore, a lot of information about 
U.S. interests in the Kurds – especially, from the Cold War period– are based on 
certain assumptions by historians and scholars. Although they were empirically 
proved in most of the cases, this could represent a source of error. Eventually, this 
leads us to a second source of error: Since we were to a largely dependent on 
secondary analysis of qualitative data, we do not have such a detailed insight as 
primary researchers have (cf. Seale 2011:347). 
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2.5  Conceptual Clarifications 
Throughout the project, different terms will occur that need a more detailed 
clarification in order to understand how we intend to use them.  
 
Balance of Power: Throughout the project, we will follow this definition of the 
Balance of power-concept: "Balance of power, in international relations, the posture 
and policy of a nation or group of nations protecting itself against another nation or 
group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. States can 
pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as 
when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or 
by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of 
alliances" (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2014). 
 
Islamic State: The terrorist group dealt with is known by more than one name. In 
2006, it was created as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). A few years later, the names 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State in Iraq and Syrah (ISIS) 
became commonly used by the terrorists themselves, Western media and politicians. 
Another acronym that is often referred to is IS, meaning Islamic State. Thereby, the 
terrorist group shows its aspirations that it is willing to expand further (cf. CNN 
2014). For our project, we decided to use the term IS since it is most known and 
vividly depicts the group’s aspirations. However, we are aware of the ongoing debate 
about the names. Furthermore, in order to quote properly, we need to use one of the 
other terms from time to time. 
 
Kurds/Kurdish minority: The Kurds do not all originate from one ethnic group. 
However, they belong to a single amalgam. Furthermore, the Kurds do not all follow 
the same religion but the majority belongs to the Sunni Islam. They do not all speak 
the same language and are spread over four different countries in the Middle Eastern 
region. Nonetheless, they claim to be a distinct community (cf. McDowall 1992:3). 
Therefore, in the project the terms of Kurds and Kurdish minority/population are used 
in a generalised manner. Even though we are aware of the fact that there are many 
factors that distinguish them from each other, we have decided to see them as one 
minority group since it serves the purpose of the project. However, when it is needed 
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– for example with regard to a specific national Kurdish minority – their 
distinguishing factor is indicated throughout the project.  
 
Kurdish region: When writing Kurdish Region we refer mostly to the Iraqi Kurdistan, 
which is the main point of investigation in this project. We do recognise and 
acknowledge that especially Syria and the Syrian Kurds have been a very important 
and main character of the current events. However, following the structure of the 
project, we will mainly – but not only - focus on the Iraqi Kurdistan region.  
 
Kurdish question: In his 2004 article, The Kurdish Question in Perspective, Michael 
M. Gunter presents the concept of the Kurdish question. The article states that there 
are about 25-28 million Kurds living as minorities within the four countries connected 
to the Kurdistan region – Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds strive for more 
autonomy and, eventually, for recognition as a sovereign state, and have done so for 
many years. They are the biggest nation without a state. However, being split over 
four different states makes the path for autonomy and recognition difficult. This 
historical difficulty has become known as the Kurdish question (cf. Gunter 2004:197).  
 
Sovereignty: By using the concept of sovereignty, this project refers to the notion that 
a state is able to make authoritative decisions on behalf of its population and that the 
state in question is in control over its territory. Furthermore, a sovereign state must 
have a government and be able to interact with other sovereign states. Lastly, it is 
necessary to be recognised by other sovereign states. Therefore, in order to be 
considered as sovereign, a state has to have independency, authority and recognition 
by other states (cf. Pace 2014). 
 
Zero-sum mentality: In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
Mearsheimer introduces his thoughts on state behaviour by great powers. He presents 
the assumption that great powers have the tendency to act under the principle of the 
zero-sum mentality because: “[…] the claim that states maximise relative power is 
tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states 
[…]” (Mearsheimer 2001:34).  
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2.6  Delimitations 
As already outline above, the Kurdish minority spreads over four different countries 
in the Middle East. In order to give a more diverse and detailed analysis of the U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Kurds, it has to be examined more carefully in the view of 
U.S. relations with each of these four countries and their respective Kurdish minority. 
However, due to the limited timeframe, it was not feasible to analyse four different 
interstate relations. Therefore, the focus lays on the Kurds as one large minority group 
and the states inhabited by them are only considered when their presence is important 
for understanding the motives behind the U.S. foreign policy or the position of the 
Kurds. 
 
As introduced in the project structure, we will focus on the future position of the 
Kurds and what this might entail. In the course of the afterthoughts section, the 
project will touch upon the concept of regional power balance in the Middle Eastern 
region. However, the project will not go into a further analysis and conceptualisation 
of regional power balance. It will only be used in the afterthoughts section where it 
provides some relevance for the project. 
 
Furthermore, in the theoretical part, we touch upon ideas from the English School – 
also known as Liberal Realism. However, they are not further elaborated. In our view, 
these ideas were helpful in order to define the concept of a great power, which is an 
important concept in the realism branch. Nonetheless, a further discussion on the 
English School was not necessarily needed for our analysis, mainly following 
offensive and defensive realism theories. 
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3  THEORY 
The following section will introduce and describe the chosen theory of this project. 
We considered the debate between the two branches of Realism - offensive and 
defensive realism – to be of great relevance for the project. The section begins by 
defining offensive realism, and in relation to this, further introduces the Great Power 
concept and the Great Power Politics debate. Finally, the section focuses on the 
relevant aspects of defensive realism. 
 
Since offensive and defensive realism both have their roots in the realism branch, they 
both pursue the objective of state survival and national security in an anarchical 
international state system. Therefore, “[...] other countries and governments can never 
be relied upon completely” (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:60), which underlines a 
pessimist view on state behaviour in general. This is one of the main characteristics of 
realist thinking. Furthermore, according to realism theories, all actors are preoccupied 
with their own interests and the state is the overall protector of the individual well-
being (cf. ibid.). “The state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics” (ibid.:59). Due 
to the underlying motives and the background of the project, the theory part is 
focusing on offensive and defensive realism in particular. A more extensive overview 
on realism theories in general is, therefore, not provided. 
 
3.1  Offensive Realism 
This section is mainly based on John J. Mearsheimer’s approach to offensive realism. 
Firstly, the theory of offensive realism will be introduced in general. This part will be 
followed by a deeper look into the term great power and the underlying assumptions 
of state behaviour in an international system that is shaped by great power politics. 
 
In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer, Political 
Science Professor at the University of Chicago and International Relations theorist, 
fully introduces the concept of offensive realism. In opposite to defensive realism, 
offensive realism claims that states are seeking for power rather than for security in 
order to survive. “Offensive realism predicts that states will be acutely sensitive to the 
balance of power and will look for opportunities to increase their own power or 
weaken rivals. In practical terms, this means that states will adopt diplomatic 
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strategies that reflect the opportunities and constraints created by the particular 
distribution of power” (Mearsheimer 2001:329). Therefore, the theory of offensive 
realism implies that great powers always try to increase their strength. That means 
they are never satisfied with their current level of power. Consequently, their overall 
aim is to become the regional hegemon1 (cf. ibid.:21pp). 
 
Offensive realism and the great power politics debate are relevant for the project since 
the theory seeks to explain great power behaviour including the power relations 
between the USA and the Soviet Union/Russia. “American foreign policy has usually 
been guided by realist logic, although the public pronouncement of its leaders might 
lead one to think otherwise” (ibid.: 26). This approach can be applied to certain events 
during the Cold War period were both states were involved. Eventually, their struggle 
for power and competitiveness had an enormous influence on other parts of the world 
– including the Middle East. Mearsheimer argues that “[…] great powers […] have 
the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states 
– great powers and smaller powers alike – are determined primarily by the decisions 
and actions of those with the greatest capability” (ibid.: 5). Some decisions made by 
the great powers – the USA and the Soviet Union in this case – have, therefore, 
directly influenced the fortune of the Kurds – for better or for worse. This will be 
further elaborated in the following chapters. 
 
3.1.1  Great Power  
According to Hedley Bull (1977), former Professor of International Relations, one can 
talk about great powers if three aspects are fulfilled. Even though Bull comes from the 
theoretical tradition of the English School, also known as Liberal Realism, his 
definition of great powers is considered to be useful for the project. Firstly, Bull 
claims that two or more states have to be considered to be a great power. Otherwise, 
the term could be mixed up with the meaning of an empire, which implies a unique 
position within the global order - in opposite to great powers. Secondly, great powers 
have to have significant military capabilities at their disposal; “[…] that is to say that 
countries which are great powers are comparable in military strength, and that there is 
no class of power that is superior to them” (Bull 1977:195). And finally, great powers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  "A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system" 
(Mearsheimer 2001:40).	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are considered to have special rights within the framework of the international 
community but also special duties (cf. ibid.:194p). Therefore, Bull claims that great 
powers, such as the USA and the Soviet Union/Russia, play a leading role in world 
politics. This means that all states are equal theoretically, however, in practise they 
are not. According to Mearsheimer, “[g]reat powers are rarely content with the 
current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change 
it in their favour. [….] Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, 
the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition” (Mearsheimer 
2001:2). Mearsheimer has outlined five assumptions, which illustrate the reasons why 
great powers always seek for more power. 
 
3.1.2  Assumptions of State Behaviour in Offensive Realism 
The first assumption is seen in the setting in the anarchy within the international 
system. Since there is no central authority over independent states, the sovereign state 
itself has the decision-making power and, therefore, acts accordingly to its own 
interests (cf. ibid.:30). Secondly, as already mentioned by Bull, great powers maintain 
stronger military capabilities than other states do, “[...] which gives them the 
wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other” (ibid.). The third assumption is 
linked to the intentions of great powers. According to Mearsheimer, it is not obvious 
to guess the intentions of the states as these change quickly. Therefore, the possibility 
that one state uses force against another state is never completely off the table (cf. 
ibid.: 31). The fourth assumption rests on one of the basic realism aspects, which 
views state survival as the main objective. “Specifically, states seek to maintain their 
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order” (ibid.). The 
final assumption claims that states act rational in order to survive. That makes them a 
strategic actor that carefully observes its environment and acts accordingly (cf. ibid.). 
To sum up, Mearsheimer’s five assumptions of state behaviour in offensive realism 
claim that there are three incentives, which trigger an offensive behaviour: “[...] fear, 
self-help and power maximization” (ibid.:32). Fear is an important factor in terms of 
shaping the international system, which leads to the conclusion that great powers act 
offensively not because it is in their nature but because the international system 
provokes them to do so (cf. ibid.42pp). An offensive realist would argue that offense 
is the better defence in order to survive (cf. ibid.:36). However, that does not mean 
that the offensive behaviour of states necessarily culminates in war. Therefore, 
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peaceful international order to which the U.S. leaders had paid lip service, is just the 
by-product of the self-interested behaviour of great powers (cf. ibid.:48). 
 
3.1.3  Great Power Politics 
According to Mearsheimer, “[...] great powers seek to maximize their share of world 
power [...]” (ibid.:140). This major aim shall be achieved through increasing their 
influence in four minor objectives: Firstly, great powers want to become the regional 
hegemon. Secondly, in economic terms, great powers seek to maximise their share of 
the world’s wealth. Thirdly, “[...] great powers aim to dominate the balance of land 
power [...]” (ibid.:145). And finally, they seek for more nuclear strength and 
capabilities in order to be superior over their counterparts (cf. ibid.140pp).  
 
The Cold War period is a good example in order to illustrate and examine the 
hypothesis of the offensive realism. During the Cold War period, the USA wanted to 
keep the Soviet Union out of its sphere of influence in the Middle East and vice versa. 
“The United States acted to check Soviet expansion almost immediately after World 
War II ended, and it maintained a formidable containment policy until the Soviet 
threat disappeared some forty-five years later” (ibid.:323). The European states were 
not able to balance the Soviet Union at that time. Therefore, in order to keep its 
influence and possibly maximise its power, the USA had no other chance than to be 
the balancing power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (cf. ibid.:327). The containment 
policy during the Cold War can be interpreted as a power-maximising strategy, too. 
However, Mearsheimer further confirms that it is difficult to empirically prove the 
assumption of offensive realism during the Cold War era since it represents the first 
period in history where the threat of nuclear weapons was present (cf. ibid.:358). 
 
3.2  Defensive Realism 
This section will clarify the aspects of defensive realism that will be applied for the 
upcoming sections. Firstly, the term will be introduced and defined. In the following, 
aspects that are relevant for this project will be underlined with arguments from a 
theoretical article by Kenneth Waltz. And finally, the concept of defensive realism 
will be further analysed by using a discussion article by Jeffrey Taliaferro who draws 
inspiration from Waltz’ theoretical approaches. 
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In their textbook, Jackson and Sørensen describe a defensive realist as “[…] someone 
who recognizes that states must and do seek power in order to be secure and to 
survive, but who believe that excessive power is counterproductive, because it 
provokes hostile alliances by other states” (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:85). This 
definition illustrates the difference between offensive and defensive realists. 
However, one aspect where the defensive and offensive realists agree is that the 
behaviour of states is characterised by the anarchical structure of the international 
system. Major differences can be found by viewing the way states chose to behave 
within the anarchical system. For a defensive realist, a state’s actions will not reflect 
on a notion of maximising relative power but more on how to keep the position in the 
system and how to maintain relative security (cf. ibid.) (cf. Waltz 1993:49). This point 
is further underlined by Kenneth Waltz’ 1993 book, The Emerging Structure of 
International Politics, where he elaborates on the point of why security will always be 
important and present with regard to states’ behaviour. One of his argument claims 
that no matter how many changes occur, or challenges the structure between states 
and nations will meet, the system will always be anarchical. The states will seek to 
protect themselves within the international system - with or without cooperation from 
other states (cf. ibid:59). Additionally, Waltz states that “[a]narchy places a premium 
on foresight. If one cannot know what is coming, developing a greater resource base 
for future use takes precedence over present prosperity” (ibid:60). Another point 
Waltz makes is that, even though economic prosperity is important as it affects 
interstate relations, it cannot be compared to the importance of military power and 
security. The tendency to value security over economic prosperity was a very defining 
moment for the USA in the aftermath of the Cold War. Today, the claim has lost 
some of its value since today’s conflicts are more dominated by economic and 
technological aspects. However, security will always be very present in the actions of 
a defensive realist (cf. ibid:66). 
 
Jeffrey Taliaferro, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, discusses in 
his 2001 article, Security Seeking Under Anarchy – Defensive Realism Revisited, 
defensive realism in contemporary times. With regard to the two approaches of 
offensive and defensive realism, he claims that expansion is another aspect where 
they differ. The offensive realists believe that there are many incentives for states to 
seek expansion within the international anarchical system. Whereas the defensive 
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realists believe that it is only under few circumstances that the international anarchical 
system will provide incentives for expansion (cf. Taliaferro 2001:129). He elaborates 
on this point by stating that “[d]efensive realism predicts greater variation in 
internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to generally pursue 
moderate strategies as the best route to security” (ibid.). 
 
3.2.1  Assumptions of State Behaviour in Defensive Realism  
According to Taliaferro, defensive realism has certain assumptions that are interesting 
to notice with regard to the foreign policy behaviour of a state. Firstly, he elaborates 
on issues of the security dilemma, which is an important and persistent factor to 
consider within the anarchical system. It is the uncertainty of anarchy that triggers 
states to increase their own security, this, however, will have the effect of decreasing 
the neighbouring states’ security – hence the dilemma. (cf. ibid:136). His second 
assumption states that the security dilemma is not the only factor that can generate 
competition and conflict. Other factors, such as geographical proximity, access to 
materials and regional military balance, can generate just as much tension, if not more 
(cf. ibid.:136pp). He draws an example: “States that lack defensible borders or have 
strong neighbours will have a powerful incentive to build strong central institutions, 
maintain large standing armed forces, and adopt offensive military doctrines” 
(ibid.:140). This point will be interesting to investigate further in the analysis part 
when discussing the position of the Kurds that have no defined border and, therefore, 
no defensible borders either. Moreover, they are confronted with strong neighbours in 
their respective region. Thirdly, Taliaferro presents an assumption regarding the 
uncertainty of how the distribution of power affects the decisions of the state leaders 
and their choice to strategise their foreign policy. (cf. ibid:141pp). And finally, the 
last assumption implies that domestic politics influence foreign policy. How a state 
reacts to the external environment can depend a lot on its domestic politics: “For 
example, during periods of imminent external threat, the calculations of central 
decision makers are paramount” (ibid.:142). This assumption is quite relevant for the 
project’s analysis since it provides an aspect of how governments, for example the 
U.S government or the KRG, choose to respond to external threats, for example the 
threat of the IS.  
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4  BACKGROUND 
4.1  U.S. Interests towards the Kurds – 1916-1990 
The Kurdish history is a history of many struggles in terms of identity and territory. 
The Kurds, an ethnic group that is spread over the four countries is “[…] the largest 
nation in the world without its own country […]” (Yavuz, Gunter 2001:33). The 
Kurds have always been a nation without a state. However, since they were equal 
members of the society in the Ottoman Empire, they did not have the explicit desire 
for self-determination. In 1916, within the framework of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
the situation changed dramatically. With this agreement, Great Britain and France 
agreed upon the division of the Ottoman territories and, thereby, put the Kurdish 
region under the rule of two more states: Iraq and Syria – additionally to the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran (cf. Barkey 2009:4). The division of the Kurdish-inhabited area has 
become one of the major aspects regarding a possible solution of the Kurdish question 
and has enormous influence on the states inhabited by the Kurds and their national 
and international politics. Hence, the Kurdish question and its history has multifarious 
dimensions that have to be analysed carefully. 
 
However, in the following part we will primarily focus on the historical relationship 
between the Kurds and the USA – especially highlighting its numerous ambivalent 
features and shifts. In this regard, the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds shall be 
illustrated more in detail. The U.S.-Kurdish relationship in general is rather unique in 
its nature since Kurdistan is not a sovereign state but a region that spreads over four 
sovereign countries in the Middle East. The USA maintains external relations with 
these four countries while having informal foreign policy interests in the position of 
the Kurds as a non-state actor in the region. Over the past decades, the U.S.-Kurdish 
relations remained ambivalent. In various cases, the U.S. government was seeking 
support from the Kurds in order to pursue its external policy objectives. However, the 
Kurds never benefited from the situation in terms of achieving their long-term goal of 
statehood. Understanding these historical connections is of utter importance regarding 
the following analyses of how the U.S. interests could shape the future role of the 
Kurdish people in the Middle Eastern region – especially, in the light of the further 
expansion of the IS. 
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4.1.1  Post-World War I Developments 
According to Michael M. Gunter, Professor of Political Science and expert on the 
Kurdish history, the “American involvement in Kurdistan dates back to World War I 
and President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, the twelfth of which 
concerned a forlorn promise of ‘autonomy’ for ‘the other nationalities [of the 
Ottoman Empire] which are now under Turkish role” (Wilson 1918) (cf. Gunter 
2011:95). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds - at least the Turkish 
ruled Kurds – had the legitimate hope that a world that was shaped around the 
Wilsonian principle of self-determination could give them the chance to gain 
sovereignty. Therefore, the USA indirectly supported the Kurdish attempt for 
independent statehood. However, due to the efforts of the Turkish government, the 
British occupied Iraq and imperial interests of the great powers in Versaille, the Kurds 
remained a nation without a state (cf. Gunter 1999:427). “They were promised their 
own state in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which officially carved up the remnants of 
the Ottoman empire. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk turned that treaty into a dead letter when 
he fought back under a resuscitated Turkish force to establish a modern Turkish state 
with new borders in the early 1920s” (Fuller 1993:109). 
 
4.1.2  Cold War Period 
During the Cold War, the relationship between the USA and the Kurds changed often 
due to various geopolitical reasons. However, at this period of time, the U.S. 
involvement with the Kurds differed from country to country and has to be seen from 
different perspectives. In 1952, in the course of the Cold War geopolitics, Turkey 
joined NATO, and, therefore, became - in the Middle Eastern region - one of the most 
important allies of the USA and other Western powers. “For the Americans […], the 
relationship with Turkey was largely determined by broad expectations about the 
future balance of world power” (Athanassopoulou 1999:vii). The paramount goal 
from the U.S. perspective was keeping the Soviet Union out of their oil-rich sphere of 
influence in the Middle East. In terms of geopolitics, the polarisation of the Kurdish 
question represented a threat to the important ties between the USA and the new 
NATO member Turkey. Therefore, the USA officially supported the policy of the 
Turkish government that aimed to further suppress Kurdish minority rights in order to 
prevent any tensions and the risk of a territorial disintegration (cf. Gunter 1999:427). 
The continuous suppression of the Kurds by the Turkish government gave rise to 
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rather radical rebel groups, such as the PKK, that was founded in 1978 (cf. Marcus 
2007:75). In 1997, the PKK was added to the list of terrorist organisation by the U.S. 
Department of State (cf. U.S. Department of State). Thereby, the USA underlined 
once more its position towards the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the importance of 
its relationship with Turkey. 
 
The opposite was true in terms of the Kurdish minority in Iraq. In the Cold War 
period, the USA used the increasing Kurdish demand for autonomy in order to pursue 
its own objectives. With the help of the Kurds, the USA tried to contain the pro-
Soviet regimes in Iraq. In his 2010 article, Douglas Little, U.S. American History 
Professor at Clark University, identifies various cases such as the containment of the 
pro-Moscow regime of Abdel Karim Qassim (1958-1963) who was removed from 
office by a violent coup d’état in 1963 (cf. Little 2010:69pp). Although no Kurdish 
representatives were present at the coup d’état, the Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani, was largely responsible for the weak position of Abdel Karim Quassim at the 
time of the coup. The USA supported and welcomed the developments. In return, 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani expected U.S. support in the Kurdish fight for autonomy that 
the superpower eventually did not provide. 
 
The attempt to remove Saddam Hussein in the 1970s demonstrates another event, 
where the USA indirectly or directly supported the Iraqi Kurds in order to keep the 
Soviet Union out of the Middle East as far as possible. In 1972, “[…] Saddam 
Hussein decided to sign a fifteen-year ‘Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ with 
the Soviet Union […]” (ibid.:74). This treaty posed a great threat to the USA and the 
neighbouring Iran that were considering an empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds in order 
to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, in the end the Kurds were left alone 
by the USA and its ally Iran (cf. ibid.:63pp)2. “In each case, the U.S. government 
exploited long-standing anti-Arab resentments among the Kurds, secretly supplied 
U.S. guns or dollars or sometimes both, and helped ignite an insurrection in 
Kurdistan, only to pull the plug unceremoniously when events threatened to spiral out 
of control” (ibid.:64). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For supplementary information on the specific cases, please refer to: Little, D. 2010, The United 
States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story, in. Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2010, pp. 
63-98. 
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For the sake of completeness, the situation of the Iranian and Syrian Kurds should be 
noted shortly. However, in terms of the further development of this background 
chapter and the analysis part, we limited ourselves and focus mainly on the Kurdish 
minorities in Iraq and Turkey. Both cases illustrate the ambivalent interests of the 
USA in the Middle East very well. Based on the Turkish and Iraqi example, one can 
see the different approaches the USA took over the course of history and how national 
self-interests shaped its foreign policy. 
 
Compared to the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds, the Iranian Kurds enjoyed relative freedom 
throughout the Cold War period. They were allowed to present themselves in their 
culture and language – even after the Islamic Revolution. The different governments 
largely accepted the Kurdish role as a minority group as long as they were not striving 
for self-determination and statehood. Nonetheless, the Iranian government rather 
preferred to assimilate the Kurds and, therefore, emphasised the “[…] common 
ancestral and ethnic roots of Persians and Kurds” (Barkey 2009:9). In terms of the 
Kurdish question, the Syrian government has been the most suppressing one. 
However, at the same time, the Syrian Kurds have been rather reluctant in terms of 
emphasising their own cultural identity and nationhood (cf. ibid.: 10). 
 
As one can gather from the paragraphs above, the USA had a very ambivalent 
behaviour towards the Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds were – generally speaking - supported 
while the Turkish Kurds were rather suppressed during the period of the Cold War. 
Geopolitical thinking mainly drove the actions and involvement of the USA. On the 
one side, the USA had to stand by its new ally Turkey that represented an important 
security partner in the region. In this regard, the Kurdish minority was considered as a 
threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey and, eventually, as a threat to the stability 
of the country. On the other side, the U.S. government was interested in the oil 
reserves in Iraq and, therefore, was even favouring a rebellion by the Kurdish leader 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani in the 1970s. As mentioned above, the USA welcomed this 
offer since they aimed to contain Soviet Union’s expansion in Iraq. Furthermore, 
before that, Barzani had promised cooperation and, most importantly, access to the oil 
reserves as soon as the aim of a sovereign Kurdistan was achieved. However, in 1975, 
the U.S. ally Iran made an agreement with Saddam Hussein and, consequently, the 
USA let go of the Iraqi Kurds once again and the possible uprising collapsed (cf. 
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Gunter 1999:427pp). “Almost invariably, […] once the Kurds no longer served the 
immediate political goals of the external powers, they have been abandoned” (Fuller 
1993:108). Obviously, in terms of geopolitics, the regime of Saddam Hussein did suit 
the foreign policy interests of the USA at that period of time. 
 
Summing up, during the times of the Cold War, the Kurdish expectations for a 
sovereign state were encouraged by the USA for several times. However, eventually, 
these expectations were never satisfied. “The seeming double standard the United 
States applies to the Kurds, of course, is really explained by perceived U.S. national 
interests […]. Although a double standard for the Kurds, it seemingly makes perfect 
sense in terms of immediate U.S. national interest” (Gunter 1999:437). Nonetheless, 
the Kurdish minority did not give up on their dream of self-determination and 
statehood even though they felt betrayed by the USA (cf. Little 1999:96). This will be 
further elaborated in the following chapters. 
 
4.2  U.S. Interests towards the Kurds – 1990-2003 
In the summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This occupation had 
sparked reactions from the international community, which led to the establishment of 
Operation of Liberation of Kuwait, also known as Desert Storm. The USA was in 
coalition with other countries but in terms of military contribution, it was the leading 
nation. Nevertheless, this operation was not successful in toppling Saddam Hussein’s 
regime (cf. Amiri 2011:189p). During Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, a 
leading Kurdish politician, Jalal Talabani, arrived in Washington in order to offer 
U.S. officials military support in Kuwait, however, this offer was rejected (cf. Shareef 
2014:146). “We had every reason to believe that they would be of very little help to 
us in the goal of the operation which was the liberation of Kuwait” (Mack, D. 1990 
(Deputy Assistant Secretary State), cited in Shareef 2014:146). 
 
The general U.S. resentments towards the Kurds were further shown in 1991 when 
Saddam Hussein’s regime increased the brutality in order to control the Iraqi 
heartland. Saddam Hussein’s increasing violence against its own people caused an 
uprising among the Kurds (cf. Meho 2004:24). Simultaneously, in Washington, the 
Iraqi Kurdish delegation was not welcomed officially but in a coffee shop by junior 
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officials. U.S. Senator Peter Galbraith argued that ”Turkish sensibilities [were] a main 
reason for the cold shoulder […]” (Galbraith 1991, cited in Shareef 2014:147). This 
event was soon to be followed by U.S. Senator Galbraith and U.S. Senator Pell 
chairing an inter-parliamentary consultation on the Iraqi Kurds. Kurdish leaders were 
present and expressed their general support for U.S.-American politics and, at the 
same time, stressed the possibility of an uprising against the Iraqi regime. When 
speaking with his deputy, Sandy Charles, Senator Galbraith stressed that it is within 
the U.S. policy interest to “[…] get rid of the regime […]” (ibid.), however, Charles 
replied: “Our policy is to get rid of Saddam Hussein, not his regime” (Charles 1991, 
cited in Shareef 2014:147). Moreover, on the 15th of February 1991, President George 
W. Bush senior stated: “ […] it would be good if the Iraqi would take matters into 
their own hands and kick Saddam Hussein out and I still feel that way and I still hope 
they do” (Bush 1991, cited in Charountaki 2011:169). In a further speech on the Iraqi 
crisis, held on the 16th of March 1991, he emphasised: “We don’t intend to involve 
ourselves in the internal affairs of Iraq” (Bush 1991, cited in Shareef 2014:148). The 
Kurdish uprising that followed these events will be further elaborated in the following 
subchapter. 
 
4.2.1  The Kurdish Uprising 
The U.S.-American rhetoric made clear that the nation had decided not to intervene 
and, thereby, support the rebels (cf. Meho 2004:24). The reason can be seen in the 
strong relation of the USA with its close ally Turkey. Turkey had become very 
dynamic in terms of its economy and, thereby, increasing its influence both regionally 
and globally. Even though Turkey had been depending on its NATO allies, however, 
its expanding economy and military had helped to strengthen its position (cf. Zanotti 
2012:5). With regard to this, it is relevant to mention that, in terms of the Turkish-
Kurdish relations, in the 1980s the Kurdish minority in Turkey had been severely 
suppressed by the regime (cf. Güzeldere 2009). “According to the CIA, ‘Turkish 
policies have fallen short of promoting a liberal multiethnic society’ because of the 
minimal level of Turkish tolerance ‘for the cultural and political distinctiveness of the 
Kurds’” (Charountaki 2011:175). As mentioned before, the continuous suppression of 
Turkish Kurds gave rise to rebellious movements, such as the PKK, which threatened 
Turkey’s territorial integrity. 
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The 1991 uprising among the Kurds represented one of the strongest internal 
challenge to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The majority of the main cities in the 
North and the South were captured by rebels (cf. Human Rights Watch 1992:29). “By 
this time the American commander of the allied forces general Norman Schwartzkopf 
and his Iraqi counterpart were in agreement to allow the Iraqi military to use 
helicopter gunships and armored cars to crush the rebels” (Meho 2004:24). When the 
attack began, important cities started to fall back into the hands of the Iraqi 
government forces. Eventually, the Kurds fled in order to not be captured by the 
government forces and get executed (cf. ibid.). The events had an enormous impact 
on the neighbouring countries of Iran and Turkey, where Kurdish civilians were 
experiencing mass exodus (cf. Amnesty International 1995:7). Following this 
uprising, the UNSC passed the Security Council Resolution S/RES/688 (1991) at the 
requests of France, Turkey and Iran that aimed to cooperate in the distribution of 
humanitarian aid for the Iraqi civilians (cf. ibid.) (cf. S/RES/688). 
 
4.2.2  Operation Provide Comfort I & II 
Eventually, as a result of the S/RES/688, Operation Provide Comfort I was launched 
in April 1991. The operation was led by the USA and aimed to establish a safe heaven 
in the North of Iraq in order to protect the Kurdish population (cf. Charountaki 
2011:169). Prior to the operation, U.S. President George W. Bush senior justified this 
decision by saying: “We simply could not allow 500,000 to a million people to die up 
there in the mountains” (Bush senior 1991, cited in Shareef 2014:149). Further he 
stated that “[…] all we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns” (Bush 
senior 1991, cited in Shareef 2014:150). The intervention of the USA in Iraq was the 
first of its kind; meaning that it had its foundation based on humanitarian grounds and 
heralded on the stark approaches of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s. However, 
actually the USA was driven more by realist thinking than by humanitarian concerns 
(cf. ibid.). This will be further elaborated in the analysis part. 
 
At the end of April, Saddam Hussein’s forces had no other choice but to leave the 
Northern part of Iraq (cf. Charountaki 2011:169). Operation Provide Comfort I ended 
in July 1991 and simultaneously Operation Provide Comfort II started. Operation 
Provide Comfort II consisted of a military force that had the task to combat a new 
Iraqi attacks on the Kurds. Thereby, the second operation did not put as much 
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emphasis on the humanitarian aspects as the first did. The operation ended in 1996. 
“The US saw the Kurdish client as a useful weapon against Baghdad. The US had 
again, for the second time, become pro-Kurdish for reasons not to dissimilar to the 
1972-1975 period” (Shareef 2014:150p). 
 
After the violence against the Kurdish minority by the Iraqi government forces, the 
Kurdistan Front, consisting of the two main parties, PUK and KDP, decided to 
discuss with the Iraqi government about the possibility of more autonomy. Both 
Kurdish parties had different ideas in various terms. Eventually, in the 1992 elections, 
they both received almost equal votes (cf. Charountaki 2011:172). Kurdish elections 
were held in 1992 while Operation Provide Comfort II still provided a certain level of 
protection. The elections aimed at overcoming the internal conflicts between the PUK 
and the KDP, and to establish a democratic alternative opposing Saddam Hussein’s 
regime (cf. Ofteringer, Bäcker 1994:42). The elections were largely welcomed by the 
U.S. administration, although the USA did not intend the creation of the KRG. The 
Kurdish government was a by-product of Operation Provide Comfort I and II. The 
spokesperson for U.S. government, Margaret Tutwiler, expressed that the USA hopes 
the elections “[…] help lead to a better life for all the people of Northern Iraq […]” 
(Tutwiler 1992, cited in Shareef 2014:151). 
 
The establishment of the KRG was received negatively in Turkey as it led Ankara to 
deal with opposing Kurdish movements. Furthermore, the U.S. government was 
worried that the elections could have an impact on its relations with regional 
governments, such as Turkey (cf. Charountaki 2011:172). The election and the 
establishment of the KRG led to a more institutionalised Kurdish-U.S. relationship. 
“So when Kurdish leaders were speaking to the Americans, it was not only a key 
element of the Iraqi opposition but also as one that represented a genuine 
constituency” (Shareef 2014:152). 
 
4.2.3  PUK and KDP Clash 
The beginning of 1994 was signalled by the collapse of the already uneasy power-
sharing KDP and PUK-coalition. The conflict escalated into armed clashes over 
territorial control and shared benefits (cf. Katzman 2010:2). The USA became more 
concerned when KDP asked the Iraqi government forces to help by suppressing the 
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PUK. Therefore, President Clinton sent a delegation letter to both Kurdish leaders 
stating: “We will no longer cooperate with the other countries to maintain security in 
the region if the clashes continue” (Clinton 1994, cited in Shareef 2014:152). 
Moreover, when Iran expressed its willingness to mediate the U.S. Country Director 
for Northern Gulf Affairs at the State Department, David Litt, made clear that “[…] if 
the fighting did not stop, and if Iranian intervention was accepted, the US would halt 
Operation Provide Comfort, stop protecting Kurds and leave the Kurds to Saddam” 
(ibid.:153). 
 
In 1998, after several failed attempts, the USA had invited both leaders of KDP and 
PUK and reached a settlement, the so called Washington Agreement, between the two 
parties (cf. Shareef 2014:153). After the agreement, the U.S. State Department 
stressed that the USA still views the Kurds as “[…] close friends and strong allies 
[…] ”(Stephenson 1998, cited in Shareef 2014:155). At the same time, President 
Clinton’s power in the Congress was weakened and the U.S. republicans took the 
opportunity and managed to pass the Iraq Liberation Act. The Iraq Liberation Act 
opened the possibility to ask for military assistance from Iraqi oppositional groups, 
such as PUK and KDP, in order to achieve the goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein 
(cf. ibid.:155). Through the Congressional decision, the Iraqi opposition was granted 
USD$97 and brought the USA again closer towards the Kurds (cf. Charountaki 
2011:187). The act “[…] officially revealed Congressional support for removing 
Saddam from power and replacing his regime with a democratic government” (ibid.). 
 
4.2.4  The 21st Century - 2001-2003  
The 21st century marked a change in the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds. The 
relationship between the USA and the Kurds became more institutionalised – 
especially, after the events of 9/11. This will be further elaborated in the following 
subchapter. 
 
In early 2001, in a meeting of deputies of state, the Secretary of Defence, Paul 
Wolfowitz, had already advised the Bush junior administration to further empower 
Kurdish opposition in order to trigger a regime change. Along with this advice, 
Wolfowitz also suggested to not include the Kurdish region in economic sanctions by 
the UN, even though that would have an impact on the relation with its NATO ally 
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Turkey. Therefore, he brought up the idea to create an Iraqi Kurdish enclave instead 
of an enclave that includes the whole Kurdish region (cf. Shareef 2014:155). The 
Kurds were still seen as an important asset in the region and the Kurdish 
representatives had developed close connections with the Bush government (cf. ibid.). 
However, the events of 9/11 changed the U.S. foreign policy towards the Iraq. In a 
speech to the U.S. Military Academy on June 2002, Bush stated that the USA “[…] 
could no longer rely on a strategy of deterrence for its security post 9/11” (Wheeler 
2003:184). One year later, he stated: “The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological 
or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill 
their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people 
in our country or any other. […] we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting 
toward tragedy […] this danger will be removed” (Bush 2003). The new war on 
terror justification provided the U.S. foreign policy with tools to focus on states that 
could possibly host terrorist groups. However, with no direct evidence linked to the 
9/11 attack, as Barber explains, because the “[...] doctrine is designed to apply to 
known terrorists perpetrators who have committed aggressive and destructive acts but 
whose location and origins remain uncertain; it has been applied however, to states 
whose location is known and identity obvious even though their connection to actual 
aggression is far less certain” (Barber 2003, cited in Wheeler 2003:187). Thereby, 
despite there was no clear evidence as such, the USA justified its Iraq invasion in 
2003 (Wheeler 2003:187).  
 
After 9/11, the already established links between the Kurds and the Bush junior 
administration became even more important. For the USA, the Kurds represented a 
group that was suppressed by its own ruler, Saddam Hussein, and, thereby, played an 
important emotional role in the U.S. rhetoric (cf. Shareef 2014:156). “Furthermore, 
Iraqi Kurdistan was providing a model for Iraqis who did not live in the northern 
zone, of how good life could be for Iraqis not living under Saddam Hussein. If any 
questions were raised before the invasion about democracy and freedom in Iraq, the 
Americans and those who supported them, could point to the Kurds in the north and 
their success” (ibid.) Consequently, in the search of regional support for the invasion, 
the Kurds were once again the only reliable partner that was considered (cf. Logan 
2003:167). However, the Kurds were very aware of the previous betrayals from the 
USA and, thereby, prolonged their decision. The Iraqi Kurds knew that their decision 
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could influence their future position after the invasion (cf. Shareef 2014:157). “They 
had enjoyed semi-independence for more than a decade, and hoped to keep it this 
way” (Logan 2003:167). Prior to the invasion, Kurdish representatives were invited to 
meet high U.S. officials and were told “[…] if they played it right, kept silent about 
nationalist aspirations, stood by the US, supported American goals and didn’t make 
trouble […]” (Shareef 2014:157), they will maintain their favourable position. The 
USA was in favour of a united democratic Iraq with one central government in order 
to guarantee the stability in the region. Therefore Kurdish support for a federal system 
was rhetorically rejected (cf. Logan 2003:167).  
 
Furthermore, from the beginning of 2002 onwards, the USA had tried to strengthen 
the cooperation with its ally Turkey. The Turkish government was informed about the 
invasion. The USA was also aware of the fact that Turkey had financial problems due 
to the gulf war and the wave of Kurdish refugees. “In the light of this, the US 
prepared a generous aid package” (Shareef 2014:158). Even though the Turkish 
government was assured by the USA that there would be no independent Iraqi 
Kurdistan, it had its resentments towards an U.S. invasion since it was fearing the 
stability of its own territorial integrity (cf. ibid.). Eventually, the Turkish parliament 
refused to grant the U.S. army access to the Turkish territory in order to have a 
favourable strategic position when invading Iraq. This led to severe tensions between 
the two allies. Particularly, President George W. Bush junior was threatened by the 
possibility that Turkey could occupy the Kurdish Iraqi region (cf. ibid.:159p). After 
the Turkish refusal, the U.S.-Kurdish relation improved again. “The closer the US got 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the more Kurdish influence became evident” (ibid.). Due 
to the Turkish refusal, the USA was not allowed to establish its own military front on 
the Turkish-Iraqi border. Therefore, the Kurds became an even more important 
strategic variable, which further strengthened the U.S.-Kurdish cooperation in 
fighting Saddam Hussein’s regime (cf. ibid:159). However, the USA was still aware 
of the strong bonds to its ally Turkey. The USA did not want to be seen biased 
regarding the Kurds and, thereby, possibly triggering a Turkish military presence in 
Iraq (cf. ibid.: 161). Summing up, Saddam Hussein’s regime had, eventually, “[...] 
empowered the relationship between the United States and Iraq’s Kurds” 
(Charountaki 2011:201). Eventually, Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 
November/December 2003 and executed (cf. ibid:220). 
26 	  
 
4.3  U.S. Interests towards the Kurds – 2003-present 
In the aftermath of the U.S. American invasion in Iraq the focus on the U.S.-Kurdish 
relationship became increasingly relevant to investigate. With the invasion in Iraq, the 
USA committed itself to stabilising and mediating in the Kurdish region because it 
had an interest: “[…] in seeing the Kurdistan Region continue to develop and prosper, 
while at the same time continuing to play a leading role in Iraq’s democratization” 
(Romano 2010:1345). Furthermore, the U.S.-Kurdish relationship was strengthened 
through the Turkish lack of cooperative policy. While the Kurds helped the USA by 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein, Turkey refused to do so. This resulted in a closer 
relation between the Kurds and the USA (cf. Charountaki 2011:220pp). When 
Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003, it provided an opportunity for the Iraqi 
Kurds, which they took advantage of. With the reunification of PUK and KDP in 
2005, officially signed in 2006, the Iraqi Kurds finally merged within the framework 
of the Kurdistan Alliance. That was a very important step towards autonomy. The 
elections in 2005 were a success for the Kurdistan Alliance – it got 26% of the overall 
Iraqi votes, which provided them with an excellent position in terms of negotiating 
the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The outcome of the elections resulted in PUK leader, 
Jalal Talabani, becoming the new President of Iraq and KDP leader, Masoud Barzani, 
becoming the President of the KRG (cf. Romano 2010:1349pp). Furthermore, in 2005 
Masoud Barzani was invited to the USA, which can be considered as a clear sign of 
the good U.S.-Kurdish relations. (cf. Charountaki 2011:222). 
 
When considering the relations between USA and the Kurds, the aftermath of 2003 is 
viewed as the big turning point of their relationship. In a book by Mohammed 
Shareef, lecturer in International Relations, he elaborates: “[...] the change in US-
Kurdish relations started after 2003, as America’s interest in Iraq broadened.” 
(Shareef 2014:164). However, Shareef mentions that the relationship was not easy 
from the beginning onwards. After the invasion, the USA had an interest in unifying 
Iraq, which meant that the Kurdish perspective became ‘just’ another factor to 
consider in the process of stabilising Iraq. And in 2004, when the USA proposed that 
the Kurds became a part of a federal Iraq, however with limited powers, it was with 
reservations. Later on in 2004 the White House expressed that they wanted the 
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Kurdish language not to be mentioned in the following constitution and there was also 
discussion about disbanding the Peshmerga3 (cf. ibid.). In the same year, these 
tensions led to a breaking point where Talabani and Barzani together wrote a letter to 
the White House explaining their discontent with their position created by the USA. 
This seemed to be a clever move since the Kurds were considered an important player 
yet again when the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution 2005 began (cf. ibid.: 165). 
 
From this it can be concluded that the influence of the Kurds, especially in the 
aftermath of the Iraq invasion, has grown also on a global scale. With their informal 
recognition the Kurds have become an important actor in the region, which makes 
them an important factor to consider in U.S. foreign policy especially because of their 
geopolitical position (cf. Charountaki 2011:223). This point is shared by Gunter who 
wrote in 2004 that - with the recognition of KRG  - the Iraqi Kurds had a great deal of 
relevance in terms of the future of the Middle East and international politics. Even 
though, the future of post-Saddam Iraq remained still uncertain (cf. Gunter 2004:204). 
 
4.3.1  The Oil Perspective 
Within the Iraqi Constitution, article 140 is of special interest for the Iraqi Kurds: It 
addresses the issues of disputed territories, such as Kirkuk, which is a city that is rich 
on oil, and both the Iraq government and the Iraqi Kurds claim it to be theirs. Kirkuk 
is relevant both because of all the minorities that feel connected to the area but also 
because of the oil. During the Saddam Hussein’s regime, many Kurds were ethnically 
cleansed from the city and replaced by Sunni Arabs, which has made the city today 
populated with different ethnic groups such as Assyrian, Turkmen, Kurdish and 
Arabic minorities (cf. The International Research Journal 2009). This issue was taken 
into consideration and addressed in article 140, which provides the opportunity for 
Kurds to reunite with their cities and, furthermore, in article 140: “[…] the Kurds 
negotiated somewhat ambiguous language regarding federal and local competencies 
in the petroleum sector, which could be interpreted to mean that oilfields discovered 
in the future in Kurdistan fall under the exclusive authority of the KRG” (Romano 
2010:1350). With the 2005 Constitution, the Kurds reached a certain level of 
autonomy, the recognition of Peshmerga and a good position with regard to the oil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Peshmerga is the KRG defence force (cf. Gunter 2011:102).	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fields. However, the city of Kirkuk was also the starting point for a new Kurdish 
opposition to arise. A part of the Iraqi Kurds did not agree with certain aspects of 
PUK and KDP. Therefore, in February 2009 a new party was formed by Nawshirwan 
Mustafa, which was named Gorran. Gorran is the Kurdish meaning for change. In 
July 2009, during the Kurdish provincial elections, Gorran already managed to 
receive 25 out of 111 seats (cf. ibid.:1351). One can argue that in the spirit of 
democracy this development can be viewed very positively, however, as mentioned 
earlier the USA had an interest in a stable Kurdistan region - especially with regard to 
the USA reducing its presence in Iraq. This could mean that “[t]he American strategy 
of getting the Kurds to compromise and hold off on their key outstanding demands 
may become less effective in the wake of withdrawal” (ibid.:1352). 
 
With the KRG’s Petroleum Law from June 2007, the Iraqi Kurds further secured their 
access to the oil. Thereby, an economic bond between the USA and the Iraqi Kurds 
was established since, eventually, U.S. American oil companies signed agreements 
with the KRG. This underlines the Kurds becoming an important actor in the region, 
which could not be ignored by the U.S. government and investors looking economic 
opportunities (cf. Charountaki 2011:222p). This is of further interest with regard to 
the oil perspective from a Turkish-Kurdish relation’s point of view. In 2010, there 
was an official meeting between the KRG and Turkey where the Turkish Foreign 
Minister stressed the importance of the Turkish-Kurdish relations. Moreover, he 
expressed the wish for more economic integration with the KRG. This represented a 
new and surprising development considering Turkey’s harsh history with its own 
Kurdish minorities (cf. ibid.: 223).  
 
4.3.2  USA, Turkey and the Kurds 
It is debatable whether or not the USA had an overall positive or negative attitude 
towards an independent Kurdistan over the course of history. On the one hand the 
USA needed the Kurds for unifying and stabilising Iraq in the aftermath of the 
invasion in 2003. On the other hand tensions were detected for example in 2007 when 
Turkey made the decision to enter North Iraq to fight against PKK, which was backed 
by the USA. One could argue that the USA could not or would not, at the time, 
publicly endorse an independent Kurdistan out of loyalty to their fellow NATO 
member Turkey. However, the USA also feared it could lead to conflicts within the 
29 	  
region. With regard to this, KRG-President Barzani refused to go to Baghdad to a 
scheduled meeting with Condoleezza Rice among others. The USA had really put 
itself in a delicate situation when trying to maintain friendly relations with both 
Turkey and the Kurds (cf. Shareef 2014:166p). However, as the former Kurdish 
delegate in Washington and today’s deputy Prime Minister of the KRG, Qubad 
Talabani, has stated “[...] that this did not have to be a zero-sum game and that the US 
could have relations with the two entities at the same time” (ibid.:167) . 
 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey and the Kurds have not had a good relationship from the 
beginning. Turkey has been viewing the Kurds as a threat to its territorial integrity 
and, thereby, having negative effects on its state sovereignty. With the Iraqi Kurds 
gaining more influence and recognition from the international community, Turkey 
fears that this could encourage the Turkish Kurds to rebel and claim their own rights, 
too. The strong tensions between the Kurds and Turkey, the USA became trapped in a 
delicate position, being an ally to Turkey but also having a great interest in the Iraqi 
Kurds to help them stabilising Iraq (cf. Charountaki 2011:228p). However, from 2010 
onwards, the economic bonds between the KRG and Turkey haven been increasing. 
In 2012, the trade between Iraq and Turkey reached 12 billion USD, where 70% of 
this represented trade with the KRG. Shareef does, however, point out that the USA 
did not seem to be fond of this growing relationship since it has favoured a unified 
Iraq from the beginning. Therefore, a growing relationship between Turkey and KRG 
could cause some tension with the rest of Iraq (cf. Shareef 2014:168). Nonetheless, 
this has not jeopardised the U.S.-Kurdish relationship since Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Christopher Straub, has expressed that USA has a good relation 
towards Iraqi Kurdistan and supports whatever decisions the Iraqi people makes. (cf. 
ibid.:171). 
 
4.3.3  Obama Administration and the Kurds 
One could argue that during the Obama administration, the USA has maintained its 
positive position towards the Kurds. The relationship has further strengthened in 2009 
with the proposal of a U.S. consulate in the Kurdish region. This proposal was 
adopted and the U.S. consulate was established in Erbil in 2011. Furthermore, from 
2013 onwards, it was possible to receive U.S. American visas from the consulate in 
Erbil. On the business level, the relationship further expanded through the signed 
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agreements between the KRG and U.S. American oil companies, ExxonMobil and 
Chevron, in 2011/2012. The 2007 establishment of the ‘American University of Iraq, 
Sulaimani’ marked a cornerstone of the cultural relationship between the USA and the 
Kurds. The first graduates finished in 2010; most of them were Kurds (cf. ibid.:176). 
Nonetheless, Shareef stresses the point that U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds will 
always depend on U.S. national interests in the Kurds being a useful tool in order to 
stabilise the region. From this he argues that Washington is in a transition period 
towards Iraq and the Kurdistan region. The USA might finally realise that a unified 
Iraq might not be a reachable goal, and that more recognition and trust for the 
Kurdistan region may be the better strategic approach. On this background, the U.S.-
Kurdish relationship in the period from 2005 until 2014 can be described as an 
institutionalised relationship. Also, it is worth mentioning that ever since Barzani has 
been in KRG office he has met with President Obama seven times (cf. ibid.:181p). In 
the aftermaths of one of these visits, Qubad Talabani wrote in his blog: “[...] I am 
finally seeing a special relationship between the United States and Kurdistan take 
root—one that goes beyond a tactical relationship and the exchange of niceties, to a 
more substantive and strategic relationship. It will be a relationship where mutual 
concerns get discussed and strategies for respective goals and aspirations will be 
outlined. […] This relationship between a superpower and a region within a 
transitioning country should not be taken for granted” (Qubad’s Blog 2010). It is 
interesting to consider that not every region, or Head of State for that matter, gets to 
visit the U.S. American President in the Oval Office - this just underlines that the 
USA views its relationship towards the Kurds as important and worth maintaining.    
 
In an 2013 article, Gunter writes about the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011, 
which was debated as to have triggered the Kurdish Spring as well. In July 2011, the 
Turkish DTK declared its democratic autonomy, which was not only premature but 
also irritated the Turkish authorities and provoked them to conduct a military 
operation into Northern Iraq in order to fight against the PKK. This can be considered 
as the outburst of the Kurdish Spring (cf. Gunter 2013:443). In Iraq, this led to 
tensions between Baghdad and the KRG in 2011/2012. The tensions got to a point 
where the rhetoric of the KRG came to a point of considering the separation from Iraq 
and getting their independence by vote. Nonetheless, representatives met in 2012 to 
discuss and decrease the tensions between Iraq and the KRG (cf. ibid.:446). 
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4.3.4  The Impact by IS 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring a new actor has made its entrance to the Kurdish 
region - the IS. Especially after the beheadings of the U.S. American journalists, the 
threat of the IS has put the Middle East region and the international community on 
alert. In a television interview between journalist Thomas L. Friedman and President 
Barack Obama, published by the New York Times in August 2014, they discussed the 
situation in the Middle East and the impacts by IS. In this interview, Obama’s rhetoric 
signals how careful the USA has planned to approach the threat of the IS. He speaks 
about approaching the problem through intergovernmental diplomacy and economic 
sanctions - thereby, emphasising not only the importance of counteracting militarily 
and expressing the need for a broad coalition (cf. Obama on the World 2014:09:35). 
With regard to the U.S. air force intervening in the region, Friedman asks about 
whether or not the Kurdish opposition is an actor the USA should support even more. 
Obama’s reasons for this intervention focus on U.S. national interests. Primarily, it is 
about protecting the U.S. American personnel and facilities in the region. Moreover, 
the USA is obliged to help if the country in question is asking for U.S. support. 
Further in the interview, Obama mentions that the Kurds have positioned themselves 
well and that: “[…] the Kurdish region is functional as we see it” (ibid.:18:15). 
Therefore, it is important to protect the Kurdish inhabited area. However, Obama 
stresses that it is not in U.S. interest to overtake the Iraqi or Kurdish air force but to 
keep its solely supporting role in the conflict. In relation to this point, Obama explains 
why the USA did not immediately send air force to counteract IS back in June 2014. 
He argues it was because that would have taken the pressure off of Baghdad and 
Erbil. The USA can not always come rescue and contain the conflict - the region has 
to solve regional conflicts on its own (cf. ibid.:19:01). Obama concludes by saying: 
“We do have a strategic interest in pushing back ISIL. We are not going to let them 
create some Califat through Syria and Iraq but we can only do that if we know that we 
got partners on the ground who are capable filling the void.” (ibid.:20:11). 
 
In an 2014 article by the former Undersecretary of Defense and Financial Officer for 
the U.S. Department of Defense, Dov S. Zakheim, he writes about how the USA 
should support the Kurds in their fight against the IS. According to Zakheim, it is in 
interest of the whole international community to stop the IS. However, neither the 
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USA nor the Kurds wants U.S. forces on the ground (cf. Zakheim 2014). In the mean 
time this attitude has changed: in an article, published by the Washington Post on 
November 23rd 2014, the Chief of Staff to President Barzani, Fuad Hussein, states 
that the Kurds need support on the ground - they feel alone in fighting the IS (cf. 
Diehl 2014). The Kurds do want and need U.S. assistance through political, financial 
and military support. In these terms, the article states that eight Kurdish brigades have 
already received 92 million USD worth of equipment and that the U.S. air force has 
helped the Peshmerga to fight against IS (cf. Zakheim 2014).  
 
In September 2014, Obama spoke to the U.S. American nation on the four-point 
strategy the USA will conduct against the IS. In the framework of a broad coalition, 
with the USA in the leading role, the first point of the strategy aims to conduct 
systematical airstrikes against the IS (cf. Obama’s Full Speech About ISIS 2014 
5:00). Secondly, the USA will increase the support for the Iraqi and Kurdish forces on 
the ground with the help of military training, intelligence and equipment (cf. 
ibid.:5:47). Thirdly, the USA will draw on its capabilities to prevent further attacks 
from the IS (cf. ibid.:7:12) and finally, the USA will continue to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the civilians who have suffered from the IS (cf. ibid.:7:43). 
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5  ANALYSIS 
The following chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Kurds as described in the history section. The project has started from the 
hypothesis that the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds has changed in the light of 
the appearance and expansion of the terrorist group IS. However, by having a deeper 
look into the history of U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds, it has become apparent 
that the assumption made can be contested. The USA has been and is still following 
its realist approach in term of its foreign policy. Over the course of history, there have 
been changes from offensive to defensive realism and vice versa. Nonetheless, the 
USA has not fundamentally changed its foreign policy approach but rather made 
adaptions to the situational changes. This hypothesis will be further analysed in the 
following. 
 
In order to roughly follow the structure of the history part, the analysis is divided into 
three parts. In the first part, U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds during the Cold 
War period will be introduced. The second part is dedicated to the post-Cold War 
period before analysing the U.S. foreign policy in the light of the current events. 
However, at this point it is important to notice that the USA does not have one 
common foreign policy approach towards the Kurds since they are spread over four 
different countries. The relations to these states are probably more significant to the 
USA due to their status within the international system. “Nevertheless, given its 
interest in the Middle East stability as well as human rights, the United States has 
come to accept that it does owe the Kurds a certain amount of attention […]” (Gunter 
2011:93). 
 
5.1  Cold War Period 
Following Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism and great power politics, it can 
be assumed that the USA based its foreign policy during the Cold War on the goal of 
maximising its power. Within this power-maximising strategy, the USA was 
following two main geostrategic objectives. Firstly, the USA wanted to keep the oil-
rich region safe and closely allied to them. The second major goal – containment of 
the Soviet Union - is linked to the first one. The USA tried to keep the Soviet Union 
out of the region in order to secure its own access to oil. Furthermore, oil supply from 
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the region and the guaranteed access would decrease European dependency on the 
Soviet Union in terms of energy supply. This goes in line with the U.S. long-term aim 
of keeping the Soviet Union out of Europe (cf. Mufti 2006:167). 
 
The theory can only be proved through empirical evidence. According to 
Mearsheimer, “[…] the evidence must show that great powers look for opportunities 
to gain power and take advantage of them when they arise. It must also show that 
great powers do not practise self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift the 
balance of power in their favour, and that the appetite for power does not decline once 
states have a lot of it” (Mearsheimer 2001:168). Offensive realist thinking by the 
great powers – in this case namely the USA – has not only influenced the Western 
hemisphere but the Global South, too. According to Odd Arne Westad, Professor of 
International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the 
Cold War and the bipolarity between the USA and the Soviet Union has influenced 
every region of the world and not just the two respective countries and Europe. This 
leads to the assumption that U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds has been largely 
influenced by Cold War thinking. “[…] US and Soviet interventionisms to a very 
large extent shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which 
political, social and cultural changes in Third World countries took place” (Westad 
2005:3). Empirical cases supporting this assumption are given in the following. 
 
As illustrated in the history section, with joining the NATO in 1952, Turkey became 
an important ally of the USA. This partnership was an major step for the USA 
towards the further containment of the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism. 
Especially, since Stalin was interested in Turkey, too. However, eventually, the USA 
– within the framework of the Truman doctrine (1947) – supported Turkey financially 
and, thereby, laid the foundation of the containment policy regarding the Soviet 
expansion (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:324). In order not to threaten the new partnership 
with Turkey, the decisions of the Turkish government towards the Kurds were largely 
backed by the USA. “This was to deny Kurdish demands for minority rights as they 
might escalate into further demands that would threaten Turkish territorial integrity” 
(cf. Gunter 2011:95). This example perfectly illustrates the offensive realist thinking 
of the USA during the Cold War period. The USA was following the aim of 
maximising its power and took advantage of the opportunity to “[…] shift the balance 
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of power in their favour […]” (Mearsheimer 2001:168). This goes in line with the 
theory of offensive realism arguing that great powers are never satisfied with the 
current level of their power but always seek to maximise their strength (cf. 
ibid.:21pp). 
 
The same was true for the Iraqi Kurds during the regime of Abdel Karim Qassim. The 
USA had a great interest in destabilising his pro-Communist regime and needed the 
Iraqi Kurds, which were largely not in favour of Qassim, in order to challenge his 
power. However, an U.S. memorandum on Iraq from 1962 states: “The United States 
considers the Kurdish problem in Iraq an internal matter which should be resolved 
internally. Our Government does not support Kurdish activities against the 
Government of Iraq in any way […]” (U.S. Department of State 1962). However, 
according to some historians, such as Douglas Little, it is not proved yet that the USA 
was not directly entangled in the destabilising of the Qassim regime (cf. Little 
2010:68). Either way, the USA was satisfied with the outcome – a coup d’état against 
Qassim in 1963. The overthrow of the pro-Moscow regime marked an important step 
towards the further containment of Soviet Union expansion and, therefore, served the 
U.S. aim of power-maximisation. Consequently, the Kurds were not further supported 
by the USA, although they were expecting it in exchange for their efforts regarding 
the overthrow of Qassim. In the aftermath of the coup d’état, the Kurds were even 
violently persecuted by order of the new Ba’athist regime (cf. ibid.:69pp). 
 
The situation of the Iraqi Kurds during the 1970s is another example for the realist 
U.S. foreign policy approach towards the Kurds. When Saddam Hussein slightly 
moved towards a better relationship with the Soviet Union and vice versa, the USA 
felt threatened and thought about using the internal interests of the Iraqi Kurds in 
order to keep Saddam Hussein in check. However, after the U.S. ally Iran made an 
agreement with the Iraqi leader, the USA quickly lost the interest in a possible 
empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds. At that time, the Iraqi Kurds did not fit any longer 
into the geopolitical strategy of the USA and were abandoned from the agenda (cf. 
ibid.:74pp). 
 
However, Mearsheimer argues that the realist approach in U.S. foreign policy has 
never been that apparent due to the liberal rhetoric of the government. Indeed, no 
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contemporary state leader from a democratic country would admit realist thinking 
regarding its foreign policy. Nonetheless, according to Mearsheimer, the U.S. 
government has an “[…] especially intense antipathy toward balance-of-power 
thinking” (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:23). He exemplifies his view on U.S. rhetoric with 
Woodrow Wilson who brought up a liberal perspective on the world by outlining his 
famous Fourteen Points. As stated in the history section, however, the Kurds did not 
profit from Wilson’s ideas eventually. This illustrates the gap between the U.S. liberal 
rhetoric and its realist actions. “American foreign policy has usually been guided by 
realist logic, although the public pronouncements of its leaders might lead one to 
think otherwise” (ibid.: 26). 
 
The end of the Cold War leads us to the next chapter where the post-Cold War foreign 
policy of the USA towards the Kurds will be discussed more in detail. With regard to 
the post-Cold War world order it is important to keep in mind that the Cold War 
period has been an important step towards “[…] the creation of today’s world, about 
how the mightiest powers of the late twentieth century – the United States and the 
Soviet Union – repeatedly intervened in processes of change in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America, and through these interventions fuelled many of the states, 
movements, and ideologies that increasingly dominate international affairs” (Westad 
2005:1). As analysed above, this assumption is applicable to the U.S. foreign policy 
towards the Kurds which has been influenced a lot by Cold War thinking and has had 
an important impact on the future of the Kurds and their struggles. In their bipolarity 
and competitiveness, the USA and the Soviet Union have affected the local events in 
the Middle Eastern region and influenced the faith of the Kurds for several times. 
Indeed, the Kurds have been betrayed by the USA during the Cold War period due to 
adaptions in the strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy, which most carefully paid 
attentions to the containment of the Soviet Union. Eventually, that leads to the 
conclusion that different geopolitical aims and strategies of the great powers could 
have changed the fortune of the Kurdish population in their respective country during 
the Cold War period. 
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5.2  Post-Cold War Period 
The purpose of this part of the analysis is to investigate the stated hypothesis 
concerning the presumable shifts in U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds in the post-
Cold War period.  
 
According to the theory by Mearsheimer, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War did not change the behavior of states – they still feared for their own 
survival and will at the expense of others seek to maximise their own power to remain 
secure. (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:361). Therefore, Mearsheimer would argue that states 
still act within the framework of realism, more precisely within the anarchical system 
despite the fact that the system is exposed to change. Although Mearsheimer is a 
strong believer in the international anarchy system existence, he does recognise that 
there do exist some signs that endorse a change (cf. ibid.). 
 
With a new world order after the end of the Cold War, the bipolar structure ended and 
left the USA as the last standing great power, causing the distribution of power to 
change drastically. This change had been influential in terms of how the USA 
conducted its foreign policy. It can be argued that in the beginning of this period - 
before the Kurdish uprising - the USA maintained a rather passive relation towards 
the Kurds in its foreign policy strategy. As already mentioned in the history section, 
in 1991, the Kurdish delegation was met with a cold shoulder as it was not received 
on an official level by U.S. officials. This stemmed from its current focus on 
preserving its own level of power, focusing on its internal security (cf. Waltz 
1993:49). 
 
U.S. officials’ passive behaviour was out of loyalty to their NATO ally Turkey, which 
has led repressive policy towards its Kurdish minority and did not acknowledge their 
culture and rights. The USA was aware that Turkey is a very important trusted ally 
that sees itself as an final guarantor of the country’s secular democracy in the region. 
In addition, as mentioned in the history section, the USA saw in the leftist Turkish 
radicals an ideological enemy that threatened Turkey’s stability. This behavior can be 
analysed from the assumption of defensive realism that great powers’ domestic policy 
is directly interlinked with its external environment and its foreign policy (cf. 
Taliaferro 2001:142). U.S. national interests are shown in how it values its ally 
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Turkey, which promotes democracy and, therefore, correlates with U.S. national 
ideology. The rather defensive policy of the USA was further shown during the time 
of the Kurdish uprising as it refused to support the opposition forces in Iraq. In 
particular, this resentment was illustrated when the U.S. officials discussed that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime should not be overthrown but only the dictator himself. 
President Bush junior expressed only rhetorical support to the Iraqi people as a whole 
- therefore, not specifically mentioning the Kurds - as that would be insensitive to its 
ally Turkey and the stability of the region as such. This event can be interpreted with 
regard to another defensive realism assumption, which states that it is important to 
consider the notion of the security dilemma, where the uncertainty of the anarchical 
system triggers states to ensure their own security (cf. ibid.:136). It can be argued that 
since the USA did not want to interfere in the region at that time, it still followed its 
defensive strategy in order to keep the balance of power in a way, which would serve 
its maintenance of security. “Defensive realism predicts greater variation in 
internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to generally pursue 
moderate strategies as the best route to security” (ibid.:129). 
 
5.2.1 The Kurdish Uprising and the Shift towards Offensive Realism 
This paper argues that the Kurdish uprising had signalled a shift in U.S. foreign policy 
towards a more offensive behaviour. At this time, the major cities of Iraq were in the 
hands of the rebels and the U.S. officials had decided to act. They did so with the use 
of military power and - together with the Iraqi army - they attacked the rebels as well 
as the Kurds. It can be argued that the USA had restored to offensive military actions 
in order to maintain the balance of power in its favour, therefore, still trying to 
support the Iraqi regime. According to Mearsheimer, it comes down the states 
calculated aggression, as the USA being a great power will reconsider carefully about 
the balance of power and how it will affect the reaction of other states (cf. 
Mearsheimer 2001:58). 
 
The aggression by the Iraqi forces in coalition with the USA had major human 
consequences as Iraq had experienced massive exodus, especially with regard to the 
Kurdish camps bordering with Iran and Turkey. This situation had resulted in the 
UNSC to pass the resolution, which resulted in the launch of Operation Provide 
Comfort I. With Operation Provide Comfort I, where the USA played a leading role, 
39 	  
heralded a stark shift in how the USA conducted its foreign policy in Iraq and towards 
the Kurds in particular. The USA started to promote humanitarian aid as it can be 
seen from the fact that Operation Provide Comfort I was based on a humanitarian 
approach. It can also be seen from President Bush junior rhetoric on the Kurds being 
killed and that the USA can not tolerate it because of humanitarian concerns. Here 
Mearsheimer assumption on the intentions of states can be used. States’ intentions are 
never 100% certain and are prone to change quickly. Therefore, a state can be hostile 
to one actor and the other day to another (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:55). This shift can be 
linked to another assumption of Mearsheimer that regards state survival, which is the 
primary goal of the state. “States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the 
autonomy of their political order” (ibid.). But survival also relates to pursuing non-
security goals, such as U.S. spread of democracy in the Cold War period or in this 
example in order to promote human rights (cf. ibid.:55pp). Mearsheimer further 
argues that states seeking non-security goals have no effect on the balance of power. 
And human rights interventionist in most cases confirms to this description: “[...] they 
tend to be small scale operations that cost little and do not detract from a great powers 
prospects for survival. For better for worse, states are rarely willing to expend blood 
and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses, including genocide” 
(ibid.:63). 
 
In the phase of Operation Provide Comfort II, which started right after Operation 
Provide Comfort I ended, the USA restored to a more offensive tactic as the second 
operation had a rather limited humanitarian concept. This time it was aimed at 
combating Saddam Hussein’s forces. In line with the theory explained, the USA had 
dramatically shifted its intentions as it now moved against the Iraqi forces. This again 
shows the unpredictability of states’ decisions. Thereby, states can never be 100% 
sure if other states will restore to offensive actions and continue to use their military 
capability (cf. ibid.:55). Moreover, in terms of non-security goals, the states 
sometimes contradict with the balance of power logic where these mostly act within 
the rules of realism (ibid.:63). The example of attempting to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein’s regime goes along with Mearsheimer, where he states an example of U.S. 
contradictive behaviour. The USA, although dedicated to the promotion of 
democracy, still supported to overthrow the Iraqi regime. Furthermore, the USA also 
supported a number of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War period (cf. ibid.). 
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Theoretically, Mearsheimer argues that other states are potential threats since there 
does not exists any authority. Therefore, the states have to rescue themselves in order 
to survive. “In international politics, God help those who help themselves” (ibid.:56). 
He further states that alliances can be created, however, many times they only have 
temporary character. ”Today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and 
today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner” (ibid.). This illustrates how the 
behaviour of the USA has not completely shifted but rather just adjusted to changes in 
the international system. However, it can be argued that the USA, by being part of the 
crackdown on the rebels, was not fully aware of the tragic consequences this would 
cause. As Mearsheimer states, great powers can - from time to time  - miscalculate 
their own decisions. This is never avoidable because states always make their 
assumptions and decisions based on incomplete information about current situations 
(cf. ibid.:58). The adjustment of the U.S. behaviour to the circumstances also 
correlates with Mearsheimer’s assumption of rationality that “Great powers are 
rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think 
strategically about how to survive in it” (ibid.:55). 
 
In terms of U.S.-Kurdish relations, at this point, the U.S. administration had still 
somewhat passive incentives towards the Kurds. This can be illustrated by the 
example when the Kurdish parties PUK and KDP wanted to negotiate the extension of 
autonomy for Kurdistan. The USA had rejected to help, stating that the Kurds should 
make their own arrangements with Saddam Hussein. Despite the fact that the Kurds 
still decided to hold elections and the USA had welcomed it, the U.S. spokesperson 
stated that USA supports stability but not separatism. The USA had used more 
offensive rhetoric against PUK and KDP when in 1994 these parties restored to 
clashes, which had signaled possible instability that could arise in the region. The 
USA warned the Kurds that they would be left to Saddam Hussein if the fights were 
continued.  
 
The previous resentment of the USA can be linked to the sensitivity of its valuable 
NATO ally Turkey. Theoretically, it can be said that the USA was again acting 
rationally, being aware of the external situation and trying to keep the regional 
balance of power in favour of its ally Turkey. The USA has “[...] weigh[ted] the costs 
and risks of offense against the likely benefits” (ibid.:58). According to 
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Mearsheimer’s assumption of rationality and strategy, this can illustrate how the USA 
calculates. It pays attention to how its behaviour would, for example showing more 
narrow or biased sympathy to the Kurds, affect the behaviour of its ally and how that 
would in return affect their own strategic thinking in pursuing their own security. 
Furthermore, the notion of security is, according to Mearsheimer’s assumption on 
survival, connected to the states question of territorial integrity and its sovereignty of 
its domestic political order. Thereby, closely connected to its national interests 
(ibid.:55). In addition to this, it is important to state that the clashes were put aside 
and the USA. was the mediator in the settlement of the issue through the Washington 
Agreement. 
 
5.2.2  The 21st Century 
Prior to the era of the Bush junior administration, the Kurds were considered as close 
friends. This was furthermore strengthened when USA perceived the Kurds as 
valuable asset in the fight against Saddam Hussein. In the period prior to the invasion 
of Iraq, the USA had intentions of manipulating facts in order to achieve its goal as a 
great power and removing Saddam Hussein. The USA had disrespected the decision 
of the UNSC and the evidence that the WMD were non-existent. The USA even 
restored to use its inspectors to spy. In terms of theory, Mearsheimer argues that 
states, which interact in an anarchical system, always act in a self-interests manner. 
The reason why states are acting on the basis of self-interest is very simple: ”[...] it 
pays to be selfish in a self-help world” (ibid.:56). As mentioned above, about the 
USA disrespecting the UNSC, this goes in line with Mearsheimer’s statement that: 
“States are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage 
over their rivals” (ibid.:57). 
 
In the time of the upcoming Iraq invasion, the current administration of the USA 
needed to asses the situation before using offensive actions against Saddam Hussein. 
U.S. intentions were now to support the Kurds, as well as Turkey. The Bush junior 
era, after 9/11, had signalled a shift from the politics of deterrence to a more offensive 
concept. The 9/11 doctrine justified attacks on terrorists whose location was unknown 
and who posed a threat to the national security of the USA and its allies. Analytically, 
it can be stated that the USA had used strategic calculation and rationale of how to 
justify offensive attack on terrorists who posed a threat to the international 
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community. At the same time, it aimed to justify invasions against a state that has no 
direct linkage to the 9/ 11 attacks (cf. Wheeler 2003:187). In terms of theory, when a 
state determines that another state is posing a threat to its survival it will restore to use 
offensive capabilities. Furthermore, as intentions are difficult to detect, the state will 
make the worse case scenario assumptions (Mearsheimer 2001:62). 
 
The U.S.-Kurdish relations moved towards more cooperation and the USA promoted 
the Kurds as an ideological example of democracy in Iraq. However, the USA had 
again been aware of the Turkish sensitivities. This can be seen in an example where 
the USA had, prior to the invasion, informed that the Kurds would benefit if 
supporting U.S. goals as long as the Kurds keep silent about national aspirations. 
However, the relations between the USA and Turkey became hostile as Turkey 
refused to cooperate with the military invasion of Iraq. Eventually, the USA was 
dependent on the Kurds. 
 
As to conclude on this analysis, Mearsheimer states that: “The particular international 
order that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self interested behavior of 
the system´s great powers. The configuration of the system, in other words, is the 
unintended consequence of great-power security competition, not the result of states 
acting together to organize peace” (ibid.:64p). This goes in line with the behaviour of 
the USA when prioritising its own interest above all. 
 
5.3  Contemporary Period  
In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion in Iraq, the USA had a great interest in the Iraqi 
Kurds since they needed the Kurds to help overthrow Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, 
the USA needed the Kurds to help stabilise and unify Iraq in the withdrawal of the 
invasion (Romano 2010:1345). 
 
The whole approach of the USA invading Iraq can be understood from an offensive 
point of view. As stated throughout the project, the USA has - in our perspective - 
always shown realistic tendencies in their foreign policy. Whether or not it is done in 
an offensive or defensive manner, it is always with U.S. interest and U.S. survival as 
top priority. With the Iraqi Kurds helping the USA to overthrow Saddam Hussein and 
assisting in the stabilisation of Iraq, the Kurds had positioned themselves as a reliable 
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and suitable potential ally to the USA. As mentioned in the history section, the 
Kurdistan region has a relevant geopolitical position. Through the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution, the Iraqi Kurds have a good access to the oil fields in the region. All of 
this emphasises the Kurds as a relevant strategic partner or ally to consider from the 
U.S. perspective. One could argue that the USA has recognised this when the two 
American oil companies, ExxonMobil and Chevron, signed agreements with the KRG 
in 2011/2012. This goes in line with the offensive approach, hence the fact that the 
USA acts on its own interest to secure oil for its own state security by creating a 
relation with the KRG. Also, Vice President Joe Biden expressed in November 2014 
that he welcomed the oil export agreement between Iraq and the KRG. Even though 
this is an agreement between Iraq and the KRG the fact that USA publicly applauds 
this can be seen as a step towards a future governmental oil agreement between the 
USA and the KRG (cf. Pamuk, Afanasieva 2014). 
 
According to the offensive theory by Mearsheimer, this economic relation between 
the USA and the KRG can be viewed as the USA employing other ways to shift the 
balance of power than using direct military power: “Because one state’s gain in power 
is another state’s loss […]” (Mearsheimer 2001:34), which represents offensive 
behaviour. The U.S. oil investment in the Kurdistan region underlines the U.S. 
interest in strengthening a partnership towards the Kurds motivated by economic 
reasons. Thereby, the Iraqi Kurds’ role changed from being just a factor the USA had 
to deal with - when conducting foreign policy interest in Iraq - to being an important 
business partner. 
 
Nevertheless, as Gunter has stated in his 2011 article: “While the United States sees 
the KRG as a friend and de facto ally, however, it does not consider the KRG as an 
important ally as Turkey. Therefore, the message is clear. The KRG must get along 
with Turkey or else, in a showdown between the two, the KRG will not be able to 
count on U.S. support” (Gunter 2011:94). Again, this underlines an offensive 
behaviour by the USA, since it acts strategically according to its external 
environment, in this case represented by the Kurdish region and Turkey. 
Mearsheimer’s statement goes in line with the points made above: “[...] states pay 
attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions” 
(Mersheimer 2001:31). To clarify this point: the USA had an immediate interest in 
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maximising its power by creating good relations in the Kurdish region. However, in 
order to secure its long-term interest in Turkey being a reliable partner, the USA had 
to act strategically and clearly identify its priorities. The USA made a zero-sum 
approach, sending a clear message that the Kurds have ‘to play nice’ with Turkey 
otherwise the USA will back Turkey. Just as Mearsheimer states: “[…] great powers 
tend to have a zero-sum mentality […]” (ibid.:34). This underlines the U.S. status as a 
great power. Only the great power status provides special rights such as the zero-sum 
mentality (cf. Bull 1977:194pp). One could argue that the actions of Kurdish-U.S.-
Turkish interactions are very much influenced by these ideas. As stated in the history 
section, Turkey has had a very tense relation towards its own Kurdish minority in fear 
of the minority separating the Turkish state and, thereby, weakening its sovereignty. 
The USA, being a NATO ally of Turkey, has backed Turkey through most of history - 
for example in 2007 when Turkey went into Northern Iraq. However, since the 
economic interest in the Kurdistan region has increased from an U.S. perspective, it 
has placed the USA in a rather delicate position. 
 
In a 2009 meeting between KRG President Barzani and U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates, Gates stated on behalf of the U.S. interests that the USA would commit 
to KRG with the following three points: “(1) To use our influence to ensure that the 
outstanding disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi Government, including the 
Kirkuk dispute and other disputed areas and the sharing of oil revenues, are resolved 
based on the Iraqi Constitution and Article 140. (2) To continue with our military 
efforts with the Peshmerga as well as with the Iraqi Army and security forces within 
the framework of our joint security architecture. (3) To offer our support and 
assistance for a census to be conducted in Iraq next year […] A few days later, the 
Obama administration gave the Iraqi Kurds what they maintained was an ‘historic’ 
commitment when it promised to broker disputes between them and the Baghdad 
government, and to give support to the Kurds in resolving the vexing issue of oil-rich 
Kirkuk” (Gunter 2011:102). From this it can be argued that the USA again shows 
offensive realist tendencies in their way of conducting foreign policy. Hence, 
according to Mearsheimer, great powers will attempt to control regions that are rich 
on raw materials and which are not considered to be a great power in order to “[...] try 
to ensure that none falls under the control of a rival great power” (Mearsheimer 
2001:144). To sum up, with the status as a great power, the USA has the necessary 
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tools and the expectancy to largely influence world politics. This is shown in U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Kurdistan region, hence, their increasing interest within 
this region.   
 
One can argue from this that there has been a change in U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Kurdish region throughout time. However, the USA have maintained their realist 
approach towards the Kurds and rather adapted to the changing situation than having 
shifted their foreign policy approach. Thereby, the USA has moved away from a 
rather passive approach towards the Kurdish question to a very committed one. Not to 
say that this commitment is without any need for excellent diplomatic skills, hence 
Turkey being a fellow NATO ally as having a rather tense approach towards the 
Kurdish question. However, Gunter points out that it can be argued that there is no 
greater grand strategy towards the Kurds due to the fact that they are split into four 
countries, and “[f]urthermore, the states in which the Kurds live are each more 
important to American foreign policy than the Kurds themselves” (Gunter 2011:104). 
On the contrary, it can be argued that some foreign policy incentives can be detected. 
As mentioned, in 2011 the American consulate was established in the city of Erbil, 
which is the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the KRG president has attended several 
meetings in the Oval Office with president Obama. 
 
5.3.1  The Current IS Crisis 
In the light of the current IS crisis in the Middle East, one can argue that the approach 
of U.S. foreign policy towards the region has become more clear - or at least more on 
display. As stated earlier, being a great power demands certain expectations from the 
USA when a threat such as the IS rises and creates fear within the international 
community. The IS already made its entrance in June 2014, however, the USA did 
first react to the threat with the former mentioned four-point strategy in September 
2014 (cf. Obama on the World 2014:19:01). 
 
To begin with, the USA had a rather passive approach towards the IS threat. Obama 
stated that it is not in the interest of the USA to overtake the Kurdish or Iraqi air force. 
Thereby, the USA wanted to stress the importance of the region trying to solve the 
problem on its own. The uncertainty of how to deal with the IS and to what extent it 
would influence the international community triggered a very defensive U.S. foreign 
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policy approach in the beginning. At first, the USA emphasised that - if their 
involvement was needed - it would not just be about counteracting the IS militarily, it 
would mostly be with diplomatic incentives such as diplomacy and economic 
cutbacks (ibid.:09:35). At that point, it can be argued that the USA viewed an 
extensive demonstration of power as counterproductive and did not want to overrule 
their allies in the region, which were fighting the threat on their own. Therefore, this 
alternative approach, which the USA followed in the beginning, can be considered to 
be rather defensive (cf. Taliaferro 2001:129). 
 
However, the situation changed and became more intense as the IS grew stronger. The 
IS became more intimidating when beheading U.S.-American journalists and brutally 
attacking the region, including civilians. So in his speech to the nation on the 10th of 
September 2014, Obama presented the four-point strategy against the IS with the 
starting line: “As Commander in Chief my highest priority is the security of the 
American people” (Obama’s Full Speech About ISIS 2014:00:16). This clearly 
represents an underlying realist approach. Obama has further expressed - in the 
former mentioned interview with Friedman - that the USA does have an interest in 
removing the IS and the threat they pose (cf. Obama on the World 2014:20:11). As 
presented in the history section the four-point strategy entails airstrikes against the IS, 
an increase in the support of Kurdish and Iraqi forces on the ground, the prevention of 
further attacks and the continuation of humanitarian assistance. These aims shall be 
reached within the framework of a broad coalition under the leadership of the USA 
(ibid.). Consequently, one could argue that the USA acts on its own interest by 
removing the IS as a security threat. Thereby, the USA demonstrates a rather 
offensive realist behaviour (cf. Mearsheimer 2001:30). Furthermore, the USA shows 
its military capabilities when bombing territory occupied by the IS. However, since 
they are backed by a broad coalition, the USA does so in accordance with the 
strategic interests of its environment (cf. Obama’s Full Speech About ISIS 2014:5:00) 
(cf. Mearsheimer 2001:31). These are all features that imply an offensive realist 
approach as described by Mearsheimer. This is also of great importance regarding 
relation with the Kurds. Before the USA got involved, the Kurds felt as if they were 
fighting against the IS on behalf of the whole international community (cf. Diehl 
2014). Now, by supporting the Kurdish fighters with military equipment and 
airstrikes, the USA shows that it takes an interest in the U.S.-Kurdish interactions. 
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However, this interest is mainly driven by U.S. internal motives such a secure access 
to oil. 
 
Some of the last stated points from the analysis will also be the starting point of the 
upcoming section of afterthoughts where this project seeks to investigate what the 
future entails for the Kurdish people. 	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6  AFTERTHOUGHTS 
In order to give an outlook what the current developments might entail with regard to 
the future of the Kurds, we have discussed the issue within the framework of our 
group. The discussion has been based on the project findings – especially on the 
history and the analysis section. Therefore, the main purpose of the following chapter 
is to illustrate the thoughts that we have gathered throughout this process and show 
our debate on the future position of the Kurds. 
 
On the one hand it can be argued that - in light of the current events of the IS crisis - 
the Kurds are left with a genuine hope for autonomy. The USA and the international 
community have been depending on the Kurds leading the fight on the grounds 
against the IS and, thereby, containing the threat for the whole international system. 
Since the rise of the IS, the Kurds - namely the Peshmerga - have been expressing 
their concerns about how long they will be able to balance the IS expansion in the 
region. The feel left alone on the grounds. Nonetheless, the Kurds have been fighting 
against the IS in order to protect their own territory. However, simultaneously, their 
resistance also serves the interests of the international community. This is also 
relevant in terms of maintaining the international as well as the regional power 
balance. It can be argued that this brings the Kurds in a position where they are able 
to put some pressure on the international community regarding their long-term goal 
for autonomy. Furthermore, autonomy, at least from an Iraqi Kurdish perspective, 
seems to have become an achievable objective. This is illustrated by Henri J. Barkey, 
Professor of International Relations at the Lehigh University, who has stated in his 
2009 academic article that: “A paramount U.S. objective is to preserve Iraq’s 
territorial integrity within the confines of a federal and democratic state. Iraqi 
territorial integrity is dependent on Iraq’s ability to integrate its Kurdish population 
into a successful federal framework” (Barkey 2009:11). Thereby, he claims that the 
USA supports a federal Iraq with an autonomous Kurdish region under the rule of 
Kurdish Regional Government. The U.S. encouragement can be considered as a step 
towards a further Kurdish empowerment. The position of the USA can be partly 
explained by the history of the Iraqi Kurds, which have positioned themselves quite 
well over the past decades. Firstly, they have proven their ability to effectively govern 
themselves. The KRG has been in power since 1992. Secondly, the Iraqi Kurds have a 
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good access to the important raw material within the region, which is oil. These 
aspects underline the assumption that the Iraqi Kurds have the capability to become 
an even more important (business)-partner for the USA and fuels the Kurdish hope for 
more autonomy. 
 
However, one the other hand, history has shown that the USA has relied on the Kurds 
several times before already but not backed up their request for autonomy in the 
aftermath. Once the problem had been solved, the Kurds somehow lost their value 
and, thereby, their strong position in negotiating future autonomy. Furthermore, 
Graham E. Fuller, an U.S.-American Political Analyst, points out that in general the 
international community is not in support of the break up of existing states since, 
eventually, that can lead to turmoil, violence and the instability of the international 
system (cf. Fuller 1993:109). Additionally, Fuller stresses the weakness of the Kurds 
by representing a homogenous group. Compared to other ethnic groups, the Kurdish 
ethnic unity is still poorly developed. The national Kurdish minorities mainly focus 
on their internal pursuit for autonomy and are not united on the question of autonomy 
and sovereignty (cf. ibid.). Therefore, a joint Kurdistan would be hard to realise even 
with support in the back. Furthermore, not all four states inhabited by a Kurdish 
minority have been as successful in integrating its Kurdish minority as Iraq did with 
acknowledging KRG and co-writing the 2005 Iraqi Constitution together with 
Kurdish representatives. For example, as illustrated throughout the project, Turkey 
has been struggling with its Kurdish minority. Turkey fears a possible recognition of 
an autonomous Turkish-Kurdish government since it would put a threat on its 
territorial integrity. Additionally, Turkey has been reluctant in cooperating with the 
coalition of the willing in its fight against the IS and still labels the PKK as a terrorist 
group. All this makes it hard to believe that a state like Turkey would ever consider 
recognising Kurdistan as an equal state. 
 
In general, the whole notion of regional power balance is a quite interesting aspect. 
What would happen if Kurdistan became a sovereign state? Would this completely 
shift the power balance of the Middle Eastern region? Would a sovereign Kurdistan 
become a regional hegemon and a more important ally of the USA and the Western 
hemisphere? From the perspective of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, a sovereign 
Kurdistan would most probably be a shift to their disadvantage. Therefore, from a 
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realist perspective, where states will act on the behalf of their own survival, a total 
separation of the Kurds will not be supported by the four respective countries. 
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7  CONCLUSION 
Throughout the project, the foreign policy of the USA towards the Kurds in the 
Middle East has been discussed. Thereby, the project aimed to answer the question 
what underlying interests caused the shifts that the U.S. foreign policy has undergone 
over the period from the Cold War era to the present. In order to illustrate the shifts 
and analyse the U.S. foreign policy behaviour, we had to examine the history of the 
links between the USA and the Kurdish population. The historical outline has shown 
different periods of U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds and how it has changed 
according to different events in the Middle Eastern region or the international power 
struggle in general. It can be assumed that the nature of the U.S. foreign policy did not 
change over the course of history, but rather that situational shifts in the Middle East 
triggered an adjustment of U.S. foreign policy. The USA adapted its foreign policy 
instruments towards the Kurds according to its state’s internal interest regarding the 
Middle Eastern region. Thereby, the great power actively tried to shape the regional 
developments and outcomes in its favour. Eventually, that led us to the conclusion 
that these shifts do not represent a reorientation of the direction the U.S. foreign 
policy is going, but rather an adjustment to the changing circumstances. In view of the 
threat the IS poses, this assumption can be related to the current U.S. foreign policy 
measures and its ties with the Kurdish population, too. 
 
Therefore, we argue that the current approach towards the Kurds does not reflect a 
reorientation of U.S. foreign policy in the region. The adjustments in its foreign 
policy approach can be explained by the situational change in the region and the 
threat of the IS. At the moment, the USA and the international community largely 
depend on the Peshmerga and the Kurds in general since they do fight the IS on the 
ground and put up massive resistance. Thereby, the Kurds have established 
themselves as a stabilising factor within a region that is breaking apart. That makes 
them one of the most reliable regional partners at the present. As elaborated in the 
discussion section, it seems like that brings the Kurds in a favourable strategic 
position in view of possible autonomy. However, the USA and the international 
community have betrayed the Kurds for several times already. From that we can 
conclude that the Kurdish path towards autonomy has always been a struggle over the 
course of history. Therefore, it is not foreseeable in any terms if the Kurdish 
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resistance against the IS could actually result in an approach towards more autonomy 
and international support. 
 
Taking everything in account, we claim that the USA has maintained its realist 
approach; either by protecting its own security and state survival (defensive realism) 
or by trying to increase its level of power in order to shift the international balance of 
power in its favour (offensive realism). Both branches are rooted in the assumption of 
an anarchical structure of the international system. These realist approaches have been 
reflecting the U.S. interests over the course of history. It can be argued that the USA 
has been acting according to the attainment of its internal state objectives. This had 
and still has an enormous impact on the Middle Eastern region and on the Kurdish 
faith. Throughout the project, we have elaborated adjustments in the U.S. foreign 
policy towards the Kurds. However, the underlying main interest of the USA has 
always remained its own state survival. 
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